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Abstract
We study the role of inter-group mobility in the emergence of conflict.
Two groups compete for the right to allocate society’s resources. We allow
for costly inter-group mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that
the opposition can accept, or reject and wage conflict. Agents can also switch
group membership. Expropriating a large share of resources increases politi-
cal strength by attracting opposition members, but implies a higher threat of
conflict. Our main finding is that the possibility of inter-group mobility affects
the likelihood of conflict in a non-monotonic way: Open conflict can arise at
intermediate costs of mobility.
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In divided societies, the group in power often engages in rent expropriation, and the
opposition mobilizes its members in conflict to alter the balance of political power.
The starting point for this paper is the observation, that a ruling group’s ability to
expropriate and the opposition’s incentive to organize in conflict can depend on the
extent of mobility between groups. The ease of inter-group mobility varies widely,
and is determined by the specific dimension of social cleavage: For example, while
racial groups are watertight, it is easier for people to convert from one religion to
another or to switch party allegiance. It is well-recognized that the nature of social
cleavages affects the nature and frequency of political conflict, but existing literature
does not provide a unified theory connecting conflict with mobility.1 Our main
objective is to provide a framework that explains the relationship between conflict
and the extent of inter-group mobility. While there is a large body of literature that
studies redistribution and conflict, our point of departure is that we study resource
sharing in settings in which group membership is a costly, endogenous choice of
people in society.
In a world with inter-group mobility, there are two possible responses to a policy
of economic expropriation pursued by the group in power. First, the opposition can
collectively mobilize in conflict to overthrow the current regime, and this threat can
constrain the ruling group’s rent-seeking incentive. Second, opposition members
may choose to move over to the group in power to access more resources. This also
constrains the ruling group as such infiltration reduces the per-capita rents of the
ruling group. We characterize the extent of expropriation that arises in equilibrium
1See, for instance, Caselli and Coleman (2013), Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999, 2011), Esteban,
Mayoral and Ray (2011), Gurr and Harff (1994), Horowitz (1985, 2001), Fearon (1999, 2006), who
present evidence of conflict along various social cleavages, such as race, ethnicity, religion, caste,
language, geography or ideology.
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as a result of these two forces. We show that the extent of expropriation is non-
monotonic and may be highest at moderate levels of inter-group mobility.
Most importantly, one the key insights from our analysis is that possibility of
endogenous mobility across groups can increase the likelihood of conflict in society.
Put differently, if mobility were very costly (or impossible), then conflict would not
arise in equilibrium. Rather, we would see the incumbent sharing resources with
the opposition in order to prevent conflict. Indeed, we show that conflict arises only
at intermediate levels of mobility.
To establish these results, we develop a simple model with four main features,
that capture a typical situation of distributional conflict.
i) First, society is divided into two groups that compete for political power. The
winner of the political contest proposes how to allocate society’s resources.
This is commonly assumed in the literature on redistributive conflict (Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000), (2001), Padro´ i Miquel (2007)). The underlying logic is that,
redistribution is a result of a bargaining process between different groups, with the
group in control of the state apparatus having the ability to set its terms within
limits acceptable to the other groups. We assume that in each period, the ruling
group gets chosen either through a default political process or as a result of conflict,
and proposes how society’s resources are shared.
ii) Second, transfers can be targeted to specific groups, but not to specific indi-
viduals.2
The group in power decides how society’s resources will be divided among
the two groups. Examples of group-based resource allocation are ubiquitous. A
2Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) provide a discussion of redistributive politics with transfers
that can be targeted to groups with fixed sizes. See Pages 107, 207.
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prime example is India, where different religious, caste-based groups compete for
group-based reservation of limited resources, such as government jobs or access to
higher education (See Chandra (2004)). In addition, there are examples of other
social cleavages, including language, ethnicity, profession, party allegiance or ge-
ographic location, being used as a basis of distributing economic resources (See,
Laitin (2007)).
iii) Third, members of the group without political power can wage conflict or
change group membership in order to improve their current or future share of
resources.
After observing the resource allocations, the opposition members can collec-
tively mobilize in conflict or choose to individually switch groups by incurring a
personal cost. These are both costly response mechanisms. The opposition’s cost
of conflict is an opportunity cost: It gives up the opportunity to enjoy its share of
surplus in the current period. Conflict can also potentially destroy economic re-
sources. In case of no conflict, the ruling group’s resource allocation decision can
still affect which group people in society want to belong to. For example, the alloca-
tion of jobs based on party allegiance may influence individuals’ choices of switch-
ing membership between parties. Redistribution of resources based on geography
can affect the incentives for people to migrate.3 Barth (1969) provides evidence of
people changing ethnic identities in response to certain circumstances. Caselli and
Coleman (2013) provide many other examples of endogenous choice of group affil-
iation (e.g., Tamil parents in Sri Lanka giving Sinhalese names to their children, or
African-Americans who passed into the white community). But, switching group
identity can be costly: One might have to invest in a new social network, incur
3Other examples include sectoral redistribution of resources between the agricultural and indus-
trial sector affecting the opportunity costs of individuals and their decision to work in their respective
sectors.
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moving costs, learn an unfamiliar trade, or suffer the hostility of members of one’s
current group.4 At the same time, the option of moving across groups increases
the opposition’s opportunity cost of rising in conflict. The substitutability between
conflict and mobility as responses is akin to the “exit and voice” mechanism that
has been studied in different socio-political contexts.
iv) Fourth, conflict increases the chances of the opposition gaining power in the
future, and the influx of new members into a group increases the probability
of winning political power in the next period, but reduces the current per
capita payoff of the existing members of the group.
We model conflict as any collective action by the opposition that increases its
chance of gaining power compared to the default political process. In practice, col-
lective action can be varied–ranging from peaceful political mobilization to violent
resistance.5 Endogenous inter-group mobility has two effects: Infiltration of peo-
ple into a group dilutes per capita share of resources, but also serves as a political
investment, since an increase in the size boosts a group’s chances in the political
contest in the future. This is consistent with the view of political groups as min-
imum winning coalitions that are large enough to gain power, but still maximize
their per capita rents.6
4For a given social cleavage, we take the cost of mobility to be fixed. In practice, cost of mobility
may also be endogenous. For instance, groups can build very strong identities that make it hard
for outsiders to penetrate, or impose a social cost on members who are likely to switch (Laitin
(2007)). An example of the second type of behavior is the “acting white” phenomenon among
African American and Hispanic students. See, for instance, Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005).
5For example, in the Dravidian movement in South Asia, the backward castes organized elec-
torally against the Brahminical control of the IndianNational Congress by forming a party called DK
(Dravidar Kazhagham) under Periyar E.V. Ramaswamy. In contrast, the Jaffna Tamils in Sri Lanka
attempted to use violence under the leadership of LTTE to protest against the dominant Sinhalese.
Caste politics in North India combines elements of both.
6Bates (1983) emphasizes this trade-off in his argument for the political salience of ethnicity:
“Ethnic groups are, in short, a form of minimumwinning coalition, large enough to secure benefits in
the competition for spoils but also small enough to maximize the per capita value of these benefits.”
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We present a tractable two-period model with these features: In a key result of
the paper, we provide a complete characterization of the resource allocations, group
membership decisions and conflict decisions that arise in equilibrium. We find that
sharing does occur in equilibrium. The two mechanisms of conflict and mobility
act as constraints to expropriation, and the optimal sharing is dictated by whether
and which constraint binds. In the unique equilibrium, three different regimes can
arise. The first type of regime, which we call no-conflict regime, is one in which
the opposition does not engage in conflict, and the ruling group allocates resources
to induce the optimal amount of switching. The second possible regime is called
open-conflict regime, and here, the ruling group keeps everything for itself. The
opposition responds by engaging in conflict. Finally, there may be a peaceful-
belligerence regime, in which the opposition does not engage in conflict, and the
incumbent shares just enough resources with the opposition to prevent them from
engaging in conflict.
Switching across groups occurs in equilibrium in both the no-conflict and peaceful-
belligerence regimes. The conflict constraint plays a role in the open-conflict and
peaceful-belligerence regimes: In the open-conflict regime, both the ruler and the
opposition get a higher payoff from conflict, and, therefore, conflict emerges. In
the peaceful-belligerence regime, the ruler strictly prefers to avoid conflict, and so
shares enough to make the opposition indifferent between conflict and no conflict.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that the possibility of endoge-
nous mobility affects the likelihood of conflict in society in a non-monotonic way.
The driving force is the fact that agents can always switch group membership after
they see the proposed allocation: This constrains the set of allocations that can be
implemented. In particular, we see conflict arise in our framework when it would
not have arisen with fixed group sizes. The allocations that Pareto dominate the
conflict outcome in an environment with fixed group sizes, cannot be implemented
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because they would induce people to switch membership, in a world with mobility:
Opposition members would infiltrate the incumbent group, thus reducing per capita
share and making these allocations sub-optimal.
In fact, at the extreme, when endogenous mobility is impossible, (the cost of
switching groups is prohibitive), then, conflict does not arise in equilibrium. Rather,
we see the peaceful belligerence regime, where the ruling group prefers to share re-
sources with the opposition to avoid conflict. It turns out that peaceful belligerence
is more likely to occur when a majority rules. Empirical evidence suggests many
examples of societies divided along lines of ethnicity or race (in which cost of mo-
bility is naturally very high), where there is no conflict over resources, and indeed,
resource sharing occurs. To illustrate, one example is democratic politics in India,
where there is a wide range of reservation policies for backward castes and religious
minorities (by which economic resources are shared), that have mitigated the threat
of conflict. Padro´ i Miquel (2007) also cites examples of some autocratic regimes
(such as Houphouet-Boigny in Ivory Coast) where, somewhat surprisingly, rulers
even from majority ethnic groups transfer resources to the opposition. To the best
of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide a theoretical foundation for this
phenomenon.
We show that open conflict arises only at an intermediate cost of mobility. The
intuition is that a high cost of mobility implies a high premium from gaining power
in the future: This means that the opposition’s incentive to engage in conflict is
high when the cost of mobility is high, and the ruling group’s incentive to induce
conflict is high when cost of mobility is low. Open conflict thus occurs when the
cost of mobility is in an intermediate range. We also show that a small ruling group
would be more prone to instigate conflict as its short-term per capita gain from full
appropriation is high.
When moving across groups is easy, then mobility acts as a low-cost substitute
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to waging conflict: The opposition’s opportunity cost of conflict becomes high, as
its members can switch their group identity at low cost. In this situation, our model
predicts that no conflict occurs. The mobility constraint dictates the optimal sharing
rule. The group in power aims to maintain an optimal size, large enough to increase
the probability of staying in power, but small enough to still have a high per capita
share of resources. This optimal group size is endogenously determined, and if the
initial size of the ruling group is below the optimal group size, we observe switching
in equilibrium. Examples of switching towards the powerful group is not uncom-
mon in history. Post-Reform Europe witnessed a series of religious switching (back
and forth between Catholicism and Protestantism), depending on which denomina-
tion had the stronger political alliance. Caselli and Coleman (2013) obtain a result
that is similar in spirit.
In most of the paper, we consider a setting in which people cannot switch groups
during times of open conflict. This is consistent with the stylized fact that members
within a group behave more cohesively during times of conflict. However, in an
extension, we also discuss how equilibrium outcomes might change if people could
also switch groups during conflict.7
Finally, in this paper, we treat the extent of inter-group mobility (measured by
the cost of mobility) as exogenous–a primitive that depends on the existing social
cleavages. However, our framework allows us to ask how much mobility across
groups an incumbent would ideally permit, if this were an endogenous choice. For
instance, people in society may differ in ethnicity and language, and the ruling
group may be able to choose the dimension along which resources will be split.
Since the cost of mobility effectively increases a group’s premium from being in
power, we should expect ruling groups to always prefer a maximal cost of mobility.
However, we find that incumbents may prefer a social division with an intermediate
7See Section III.G for a detailed discussion.
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cost of mobility: This happens when conflict is a strong threat, i.e., it sufficiently
reduces the chances of the incumbent retaining power.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to the large literature on conflict in divided societies. The ex-
isting literature argues that inter-group differences can matter in political coalition
formation and, thereby, in political conflict. Fearon (2006) argues that inter-group
heterogeneity and intra-group homogeneity help political entrepreneurs mobilize
people based on group identities. Bates (1983) suggests that group identities mat-
ter for forming coalitions in distributional conflict over political goods. Closer to
our work are Fearon (1999) and Caselli and Coleman (2013), who consider the
possibility of inter-group mobility. Fearon suggests that distributive politics favors
coalitions based on unchangeable characteristics “because it makes excluding losers
from the winning coalition relatively easy.” Caselli and Coleman (2013) are the first
to develop a model that allows inter-group mobility. They find that the likelihood
of conflict increases with the cost of mobility. We generate a starkly different set
of predictions. We find that the ease of mobility actually increases the likelihood
of conflict. In particular, unlike in Caselli and Coleman (2013), conflict would not
arise in our model if mobility were impossible. In a situation with a high cost of
mobility, while the opposition has a strong incentive to engage in conflict to seize
power, the incumbent wants to share resources to mitigate conflict. This tension
can result in a peaceful-belligerence equilibrium–an aspect consistent with empiri-
cal observation, but not captured in previous work. Our work suggests that conflict
(and consequent expropriation) arises when excessive mobility threatens to dilute
the incumbent’s per capita share – this happens at intermediate levels of cost of
mobility. These predictions are driven by a substantive difference in how conflict
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and mobility are modeled. Caselli and Coleman (2013) study a model in which one
group can exclude another from a public good, and the members of the excluded
group may switch to the other group. Exclusion is synonymous with conflict. On
the contrary, in our model, economic exclusion and conflict are separate phenom-
ena determined endogenously in equilibrium. Caselli and Coleman (2013) do not
consider the possibility that if enough resources are shared with the opposition, it
might be prevented from engaging in conflict.
This paper is also connected to the literature on the relationship between conflict
and measures of fragmentation in societies. One class of such measures depends on
the distribution of group size alone. For example, the Hirschman-Herfindahl frac-
tionalization index (Hirschman (1964)) is widely used in empirical studies on con-
flict.8 Subsequent work introduced polarization indices that incorporate inter-group
heterogeneity through a notion of inter-group distance (Esteban and Ray (1994)).9
Recent work by (Esteban and Ray (2011)) argues that fractionalization measures
that do not depend on variations in inter-group differences cannot capture the ex-
tent of division in societies, and find that the polarization measure is significant in
predicting social conflict. We view our work as complementary to this literature.
Our model suggests that measures of division in societies, as a predictor of conflict,
must incorporate information on both group sizes and inter-group differences.
We also contribute to the literature on conflict and rent seeking (e.g. Grossman
(1991), Hirshleifer (1995), Azam (1995), Azam (2001), Esteban and Ray (1999),
Esteban and Ray (2008), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001)).10 However, our paper
is substantively different in that we are interested in relating inter-group mobility to
conflict.
8Though widely used, the empirical connection is not always strong (Collier and Hoeffler (2004),
Fearon and Laitin (2003), Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004).
9For other references on measures of polarization, please see Esteban, Gradı´n and Ray (2007).
10Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) provide a comprehensive survey of this literature.
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Finally, our work is related to a vast empirical literature on inter-group conflict.
Collier (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) provide useful surveys of this
literature. In our framework, conflict and economic rent seeking are simultaneously
determined, and the equilibrium amount of rent seeking varies non-monotonically
with respect to inter-group mobility. These results have testable implications, and a
systematic empirical analysis would be very interesting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I contains the model. In
Section II, we characterize the resource allocations and the regimes that arise in
equilibrium. In Section III, we discuss the key implications and empirical predic-
tions of our paper. Section IV concludes. Most proofs are in the Appendix.
I Model
Consider the following two-period game. There is a continuum of agents of mea-
sure 1. Members of society are divided into two groups A and B. In each period,
a fixed amount of resources (normalized to 1) must be divided between the two
groups.11 Agents can participate in some economic activity, and the resources are
productive inputs that agents can use to enhance their payoffs from economic activ-
ity.
Each period (t = 1, 2) starts with a ruling group Wt. (We use the terms ruling
group, winning group and incumbent interchangeably). At the start of period 1,
suppose that the size of the winning group is pi0. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the group with political power at the start of the game is group A. The
winning group proposes a sharing rule αt, where αt is the fraction of resources to
be retained by the ruling group. Once the ruling group announces the split αt, the
11Our results are unchanged as long as the size of resources in each period is independent of the
group sizes.
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losing group (opposition) Lt can choose to either accept its share or reject it.
If the opposition rejects the sharing rule, the ruling group retains all the re-
sources in the current period, and the opposition mobilizes its members in conflict.
Engaging in conflict is a group decision taken by the opposition.12 In terms of
current-period payoffs, conflict is socially wasteful: A fraction (1 − k) of the en-
tire surplus gets destroyed. The opposition group gets zero economic payoff in the
current period, and the incumbent group enjoys the remaining surplus.13 The game
moves to the next period with a possibility of regime change. The ruling group
stays in power with probability pc(pit) where pit denotes the size of the ruling group
in the current period. We call pc(·) the conflict success function.
If the opposition accepts the sharing rule, each individual (inWt and Lt) decides
whether to remain in his own group or to switch to the other group.14 Individuals
can change groups at a cost φ ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter φ measures how difficult it is
to assimilate into a different group. For example, φ may represent the cost associ-
ated with entry barriers such as language-based discrimination. In other contexts, φ
may measure the extent to which groups are able to discriminate; for instance, it is
easy to discriminate based on skin color or racial identity, making such groups hard
to infiltrate (high φ).15 Here, while switching groups is costly, the cost is bounded.
In particular, φ ≤ 1 implies that if the ruling group keeps all resources for itself, it
12We ignore the collective-action problem here. Think of a leader being able to coordinate the
decision to wage conflict.
13We could have an alternative specification of the model in which the incumbent can retain kαt
in conflict rather than simply k. Here, the interpretation is that after the incumbent decides the
allocation, the opposition chooses to either consume its share of resources in productive economic
activity or to invest it to mobilize conflict. It can be easily shown that, also, in this case, α1 = 1 is
the strictly optimal allocation for the incumbent.
14Here, switching is allowed only if the sharing rule is accepted. Our results would be qualita-
tively unchanged if we allowed mobility also after conflict. Please see Section III.G for a detailed
discussion.
15As mentioned before, in reality, φ may be endogenous: A group can decide to discriminate
against members who have infiltrated from a different group and effectively increase the cost of
mobility. In this paper, we take φ as exogenous.
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would be profitable for all members of the other group to switch over.16
Switching changes the size of the groups. Let pit and 1 − pit denote the sizes
of the groups at the end of period t, after individuals have taken group membership
decisions. If a group of size pit gets fraction αt of society’s resources, the per capita
payoff that its members get from economic activity is given by αt
pit
(the assumption
of linear payoff from resources is made for simplicity).17 The game then moves to
the next period with a possibility of regime change. One group is chosen as the
ruler for the next period through a default political process. We abstract from the
institutional details of the political contest, and simply assume that the ruler Wt
remains in power with the probability pd(pit). We assume that the political contest
success function pd(pi) is increasing in group size pi ∈ [0, 1], and is continuous and
twice differentiable. For tractability, we also assume that pd(pi)(1 − pi) is single-
peaked, and the maximum is attained at p˜i ∈ (0, 1).18
In our model, a change of regime can take place either through the default po-
litical process or through conflict. We interpret conflict as any kind of political
activism undertaken by the opposition group that is costly in the short-run–such as
violent protests, demonstrations, or mobilization of voters–but can lead to a change
of regime with a higher probability. We therefore restrict attention to the case where
pc(·) ≤ pd(·).19
16We also discuss the case in which moving across groups is “prohibitively” costly for some
groups. See Section III.A.1 for a detailed discussion.
17We assume that a group’s resources are evenly divided among its members. In many contexts, it
may be reasonable to assume that resources are shared unequally, based on a hierarchy in the group.
We do not address this issue here.
18Our assumptions on pd(·) allow for many common contest functions such as S-shaped contest
functions and proportional representation. “First-past-the-post” functions are a limit case of the class
of functions we consider.
19It is also worthwhile to note that our results do not rely on the implicit assumption that probabil-
ity of retaining power depends on the group size. We can obtain a qualitatively similar equilibrium
characterization, if pc and pd are both constants with pc < pd. The key difference is that a constant
pd implies that there is no benefit of having a larger group, which in turn implies that the incumbent
has no reason to induce switching. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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The solution concept is sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Note that there are
two kinds of decisions being made: The winning group makes a collective decision
on the allocation rule, and the opposition makes a collective decision on whether
or not to accept the proposed allocation. When groups make collective decisions,
they seek to maximize the expected long-run payoff of their members.20 Since we
consider a finite number of periods, we assume that the long-run payoff is simply
the sum of per-period payoffs. However, group members make individual switching
decisions that are based on maximizing their short-term payoffs. We interpret peri-
ods as generations and, hence, treat individual members as myopic and the groups
as long-lived. The qualitative results are unchanged if we considered non-myopic
agents. Please refer to Section III.B for a detailed discussion. We make the tie-
breaking assumption that when the opposition is indifferent between accepting and
rejecting an offer, it accepts.
II Analysis
We solve the two-stage game by backward induction.
II.A Equilibrium play in period 2
Consider play in period 2, after a ruling group has been chosen. Any subgame is
described by the identity and size of the group in power. Let W2 ∈ {A,B} denote
the ruling group and let piW1 denote its size. To characterize equilibrium play, we
proceed in three steps. We first characterize the switching rule in period 2 (and
resulting group sizes) as a function of the announced allocation. Next, we show
20In order to focus on the key issue, we ignore collective-action problems despite assuming a
continuum of agents. This is a reasonable here, since individuals in a group are identical, and so
decisions can be unanimous.
14
that conflict never arises in period 2. Finally, we characterize the optimal allocation
for the ruling group, and show that it induces no switching by either group in the
second period.
It is easy to see that it is impossible to have a situation where members of both
groups want to switch to the other group. Further, if the group compositions are
such that members of one group have a strict incentive to switch to the other group,
the size of that group continues to decrease until the incentive to switch no longer
exists. Consequently, in equilibrium, members of neither group can have a strict
incentive to switch to the other group.21 Notice that since the share of surplus
remains unchanged, as individuals switch from, say, group B to group A, the per
capita payoff of the members of group B increases and that of members of group
A decreases. The two above conditions together imply that the size of group B
reduces to the point where the members are indifferent between switching and not
switching.
The following lemma characterizes the group compositions that obtain in equi-
librium at the end of period 2 (as a result of potential switching), for any given
allocation αW2 : If the incumbent retains a very high (very low) share of the re-
sources, this induces switching from the opposition (incumbent) group to the other
group. If the allocation is close to the proportional allocation, then no switching
occurs.
Lemma 1 (Group Switching Decisions in Period 2). Suppose that the ruling
group W2 is of size pi
W
1 at the start of period 2, and offers an allocation α
W
2 . De-
fine functions f(pi) ≡ pi + φpi(1 − pi) and g(pi) ≡ pi − φpi(1 − pi). The following
describes the resulting group size piW2 at the end of period 2, given that the offer of
21This description of equilibrium group sizes is similar to the long-run entry and exit conditions
for firms in a perfectly competitive market.
15
an allocation αW2 is accepted.
If αW2 < g(pi
W




If αW2 ∈ [g(piW1 ), f(piW1 )], then piW2 = piW1
If αW2 > f(pi
W




The proof of the lemma is in the appendix. We can now characterize the optimal
offer made by groupW2 in period 2. Since there is no gain from conflict in the sec-
ond period, any offer αW2 > 0 would be accepted by group L2. So, the ruling group
W2 chooses α
∗








of its current members.
The following lemma establishes that the per capita payoff attains a maximum at
the point where switching is just prevented.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the size of group W2 at the beginning of period 2 is pi
W
1 .







1 (1− piW1 ).
The proof is in the appendix. To see the intuition, notice that for switching to
occur, the group that attracts new members must offer a higher per capita payoff:
The group attracting members should have a payoff higher than 1, while the other
group must have a payoff lower than 1.22 Therefore, any allocation in which the in-
cumbent induces its own members to switch to the opposition is strictly dominated
by the allocation αW = piW . The incumbent may, however, attract members by in-
creasing its own allocation, but in this case, switching ensures that the group size of
the incumbent increases at a rate faster than the increase in its share of surplus. This
decreases the per capita share. Since there is no political benefit from an increased















This argument directly yields the next proposition which characterizes play in the
second period.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Behavior in Period 2). Suppose that the ruling group
is of size piW1 at the start of period 2.




1 (1− piW1 ) to itself and
the remainder (1− α∗2) to the opposition.
ii) The opposition does not engage in conflict.
iii) No switching occurs across groups. In particular, members of the ruling
group strictly prefer to remain in the group, and members of the opposition
are indifferent between switching and not switching.
iv) The per capita payoff of the ruling group in period 2 is given by 1+φ(1−piW1 )
and that of the opposition is 1− φpiW1 .
The crux of the result is that even though there is no threat of conflict in the last
period, the incumbent still leaves some surplus for the opposition. The amount of
sharing is driven by the “switching constraint.” The ruling group shares just enough
resources to make the opposition indifferent between switching and not. Endoge-
nous inter-group mobility acts as a disciplining device for the incumbent and pre-
vents total expropriation of resources. In equilibrium, there is no switching.23
Proposition 1 says that for a group of size pi1 at the end of period 1, the per
capita payoff in period 2 is 1 + φ(1− pi1) if it wins political power in period 2, and
1−φ(1− pi1) if the other group wins political power. Notice that if mobility across
groups were costless, then all members of society would enjoy an equal payoff of
23If we were to introduce some heterogeneity in switching costs, switching would occur in equi-
librium. We make the assumption of uniform costs of mobility just for simplicity.
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1 regardless of which group was in power. With a positive cost of mobility, there
is a premium from being in power. For a group with size pi1, the per capita payoff
premium from winning political power is 2φ(1 − pi1), which is increasing in the
cost of mobility and decreasing in group size.
This has two important implications. First, as the cost of mobility increases, the
opposition in period 1 has a higher propensity to launch conflict, while the incum-
bent has a stronger incentive to avoid conflict. Thus, at a high cost of mobility, the
threat of conflict is more salient in society: Either there will be actual conflict in
equilibrium, or the allocation of surplus will be driven by the necessity to prevent
conflict. Second, while an increase in group size increases the probability of win-
ning power in the next period, it also reduces the value of political power by diluting
the per capita premium earned. The decision to attract switchers in period 1 then
involves a tradeoff between an increased probability of winning and a loss in per
capita payoffs.
II.B Equilibrium play in the first period
Next, we characterize equilibrium behavior in period 1. Without loss of generality,
suppose that group A is the winning group at the start of the game–i.e., W1 = A.
Group A must choose an optimal allocation of resources αA1 . Once the allocation
is announced, the opposition can either accept it or reject it. If the allocation is
accepted, we say that play proceeds along the “economic path,” or the path of eco-
nomic activity (in which switching can take place). If the allocation is rejected, we









denote the per capita payoffs to members in groupA andB, respectively, when play
proceeds along the economic path, given allocation αA1 and induced new group size
piA1 . Similarly, let PA and PB denote the per capita payoffs, when play proceeds
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along the path of conflict, given αA1 and pi
A
0 .
II.B.1 Play along economic path in period 1
Consider the node in period 1, where the ruling group A offers an allocation αA1
that group B accepts. By offering different allocations, the ruling group can induce
switching activity and change the group size. The following lemma characterizes
the new group size piA1 as a function of the offered allocation α
A
1 , for any given
incumbent size piA0 .
Lemma 3. [Group Switching Decisions in Period 1] Assume that A is the incum-
bent group in period 1 with size piA0 . If the announced allocation α
A
1 is accepted,








1 ∈ [g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )]










where f and g are defined as before: f(pi) ≡ pi+φpi(1−pi) and g(pi) ≡ pi−φpi(1−
pi).
Since switching decisions are based only on current-period payoffs, Lemma 3
is a replica of Lemma 1, and, hence, we omit the proof. As before, switching
occurs from B to A (A to B) if the A retains a high (low) share of the resources.
Along the economic path, the incumbent will choose an allocation that induces its
most-preferred group size.
The next lemma characterizes this optimal group size pi1 and the corresponding
allocation (denoted by αe). It turns out that the incumbent’s payoff on the economic
path is maximized at an intermediate group size. To see why, recall that increasing
group size has two opposing effects: It increases the incumbent’s probability of
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retaining power on the economic path, and it reduces the per capita payoff. For
low pi1, the first effect dominates, and so, economic payoff is increasing in pi1. For
values of pi1 close to 1, the opposite effect dominates. Since we assume pd(pi)(1−pi)
is single-peaked, the unique maximum payoff is attained at piA1 = p˜i. In particular,
Lemma 4 shows that if piA0 < p˜i, then the incumbent shares more to induce some
switching so that the new group size piA1 = p˜i. If the initial group size pi
A
0 is already
larger than p˜i, then the maximal payoff on the economic path is reached when the
opposition members are indifferent between switching and not switching–i.e., at
αA1 = f(pi
A
0 ). The lemma also shows that the payoff on the economic path for
group B is single-peaked in the share of surplus.
Lemma 4 (Maximal Payoff on Economic Path). Assume that A is the incumbent
group in period 1 with size piA0 . Suppose that its offered allocation α
A
1 is accepted









1 )) are single-peaked in α
A
1 . The payoff for groupA is maximized
at αA1 = α
e, given by
αe = f(piA), where piA = max{piA0 , p˜i}.
The proof of the lemma, in the appendix, builds on an intuition similar to that
of Lemma 2.
II.B.2 Opposition’s preference for conflict in period 1
We have characterized group compositions induced by each allocation conditional
on acceptance and the corresponding payoffs for each group on the economic path.
Next, in order to determine which path of play will be chosen in equilibrium, we
analyze each group’s preferences over going down the path of conflict. Consider,
first, the preferences of the opposition.
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Lemma 5 (Opposition’s Conflict Threshold). Assume that A is the incumbent
group in period 1 with size piA0 .
i) There is a threshold α¯ ∈ [0, 1] such that group B accepts an allocation αA1 ,
proposed by group A, if and only if the allocation satisfies αA1 ≤ α¯.
ii) The threshold allocation α¯ is decreasing in the cost of mobility, and there
exists a threshold φ1 > 0 such that α¯ = 1 if φ ≤ φ1. Thus, all allocations are
accepted if φ < φ1.
The interested reader may refer to the Appendix for the formal proof. The two
thresholds φ1 and α¯ completely describe the opposition’s preferences over conflict.
The decision to reject the incumbent’s offer and launch conflict may be thought of
as an investment. By rejecting an offer, the opposition gives up its payoff in the
current period, but raises the probability of winning power in the next period. If
the cost of intergroup mobility is below the threshold φ1, then even if the incum-
bent group offers nothing to the opposition, the opposition finds it more profitable
to simply switch sides and share the incumbent’s surplus rather than launch con-
flict. However, if the cost is above φ1, the premium from winning power is large
enough so that the current-period benefit must be high enough for the allocation to
be accepted.
II.B.3 Incumbent’s preference for conflict in period 1
Lemma 5 tells us thatE := [0, α¯] is the set of allocations that induces the opposition
to follow the economic path, and the complement (which we denote by P ) is the
set of allocations that induces the opposition to engage in conflict.24 To understand
which path of play the incumbent would prefer, we need to compare the incumbent’s
24Notice that, if φ ≤ φ1, then P is an empty set.
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payoff along the path of conflict with its maximum possible payoff along the eco-




1 ) ≡ EA(αe, piA1 (αe, piA0 )).
We show in the following lemma that there is a threshold such that the incumbent’s
maximal payoff on the economic path is higher than that on the conflict path if and
only if the cost of mobility is above the threshold.
Lemma 6 (Incumbent’s Conflict Threshold). Assume that A is the incumbent
group in period 1 with size piA0 . There exists a threshold φ2 such that group A’s
maximal payoff along the economic path is weakly greater than its payoff along the
conflict path, if and only if the cost of mobility φ ≥ φ2.
The proof of the lemma is in the Appendix. The intuition is straightforward.
By inducing the path of conflict, the incumbent can enjoy the entire surplus in
the current period, but there is a reduction in the probability of retaining power in
the next period. Therefore, inducing conflict is worthwhile only if the premium
from winning power in the next period is low–i.e., the cost of mobility is below a
threshold.
Note that φ2 can lie outside [0, 1]. Since the attractiveness of conflict is in-
creasing in k, the threshold φ2 is strictly increasing in k. If k > pi
A
0 , it is possible
that φ2 > 1. However, if conflict is very destructive, then φ2 < 0. Lemmas 5
and 6 together characterize the equilibrium behavior for any φ up to max{φ1, φ2}:
If φ < φ1, then the incumbent follows the economic path, and for φ between φ1 and
max{φ1, φ2}, the incumbent follows the path of conflict.
It remains to characterize the equilibrium for φ > max{φ1, φ2}. In this range,
the incumbent prefers the economic path, and its most preferred allocation is αe.
Next, we characterize the conditions under which the opposition does, indeed, ac-
cept αe. We show that there is a threshold φ3, above which α
e is not feasible along
the economic path. If φ is very high (φ > φ3), then there is a high premium from
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power in the second period. This increases the propensity of the opposition to en-
gage in conflict. In this case, a split of αe leaves too little for the opposition to
accept and is, therefore, not feasible on the economic path. To induce the oppo-
sition to follow the economic path, the incumbent needs to offer a higher share.
The “best” allocation for the incumbent that still induces economic activity is then
α, where the opposition is given just enough to make it indifferent between the
economic path and conflict.
Lemma 7 (Feasibility of αe on economic path). Assume that A is the incumbent
group in period 1 with size piA0 . There exists a threshold φ3 > 0, such that
i) Group B accepts allocation αe if and only if the cost of mobility φ is weakly
less than the threshold φ3.
ii) If φ > φ3, allocation α
e will be rejected by group B. In this case, the max-
imum share that group A can retain, while still inducing the economic path,
is α¯, where α¯ < αe.
The interested reader may refer to the Appendix for the proof. This lemma
implies that if φ > φ3, then the incumbent must choose between inducing the eco-
nomic path (by offering α¯) and inducing conflict. Recall, that as the cost of mobility
increases, there are two opposing effects: On the one hand, there is a large premium
from gaining power in the next period, and so the incumbent would prefer to induce
economic activity. On the other hand, as φ increases, the incumbent has to offer
more to the opposition in the current period to induce economic activity. The in-
cumbent’s choice is driven by this tradeoff across periods. It turns out that for large
enough φ, the first effect dominates the second. In other words, there is a threshold




0 )) to PA.
The following lemma states this formally.
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Lemma 8 (Sharing to prevent conflict). Assume that A is the incumbent group
in period 1 with size piA0 . There exists a threshold φ4 ≥ max{φ2, φ3}, such that, if
φ ≥ φ4, then A prefers to induce the economic path (by offering α) rather than the
conflict path.
The proof of the lemma is in the Appendix.
II.B.4 Incumbent’s optimal allocation choice in period 1
Now, we can fully characterize the resource allocations that arise in equilibrium.
There are two factors that determine how the incumbent decides to allocate re-
sources. First, if the incumbent keeps too much surplus for itself, it may attract
switchers from the opposition, which would increase its political strength, but re-
duce the per capita share for the original members of the group. Thus, the incum-
bent will decide its allocation so as to achieve its optimal group size. Second, the
ruling group might also want to share resources with the opposition so that the eco-
nomic path is sufficiently attractive for the opposition, and they do not engage in
conflict. These two constraints on expropriation–the switching constraint and the
conflict constraint–together determine how resources are shared on the economic
path. In the unique equilibrium, three different regimes arise depending on param-
eter values.
• No-Conflict regime: In this regime, play proceeds on the economic path, and
the switching constraint determines the allocation. The optimal allocation
choice is α∗1 = α
e. If piA0 < p˜i, the incumbent induces opposition members
to switch and achieve the target group size p˜i. If piA0 > p˜i, then there is no
switching, and the incumbent shares enough to keep the opposition indiffer-
ent between switching and not switching.25
25Here, we have considered a two-period game for tractability. Further, any group size can be
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• Peaceful-Belligerence regime: In this regime also, play proceeds along the
economic path, but the extent of sharing is driven by the imperative to pre-
vent the opposition from engaging in conflict. Here, α∗1 = α. The incumbent
shares just enough resources to make the opposition indifferent between the
economic path and conflict. If piA0 < pi
A
1 (α) ≤ p˜i, then there is some switch-
ing, and otherwise, there is no switching.
• Open-Conflict regime: In this regime, play proceeds along the conflict path.
The incumbent implements conflict through full exploitation of resources–
i.e., α∗1 = α
P = 1. Neither the conflict constraint nor the switching constraint
binds, and the incumbent prefers to allow conflict.
The next proposition characterizes equilibrium play in the first period.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Allocation Choice in Period 1). Assume thatA is the
incumbent group in period 1 with size piA0 . The equilibrium regimes (and respective
allocations α∗1) that arise in period 1, are characterized as follows:
• If φ ≤ φ1, then the no-conflict regime prevails (with equilibrium allocation
α∗1 = α
e).
• If φ ∈ (φ1, φ2], then the open-conflict regime occurs (with α∗1 = 1).
• If φ ∈ (max {φ1, φ2} , φ3], then the no-conflict regime prevails (with α∗1 =
αe).
achieved in the current period by appropriate choice of allocation. It would be an interesting line of
research to consider a multi-period game, and study the dynamics of group-sizes. A comprehensive
analysis of the multi-period game is much beyond the scope of this paper. We conjecture that in the
dynamic game, whenever there is no conflict, the incumbent would increase its size unless already
larger than its optimal size. Moreover, as power alternates, group sizes would swing in opposite
directions, but the size of each group would vary within an upper and a lower limit.
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• If φ ∈ (max {φ2, φ3} , φ4) then peaceful-belligerence regime occurs (with
α∗1 = α¯) if k is lower than a certain threshold, and open conflict prevails
(with α∗1 = 1) otherwise.
• If φ ≥ φ4, then peaceful-belligerence prevails (with α∗1 = α¯).
The proof is in the Appendix. The intuition is as follows. When the cost of mo-
bility is low, the incumbent wants to induce conflict by retaining the entire surplus
in the current period. However, its ability to induce conflict is limited by the oppo-
sition’s preference for conflict. When the cost of mobility is sufficiently low, even
if the incumbent retains a very high share, the opposition finds it more profitable to
switch groups. However, at an intermediate range of φ, the opposition does respond
by engaging in conflict. When the cost of mobility is high, the premium from gain-
ing power in the second period is high. So, the incumbent wants to avoid conflict
to retain power, while the opposition wants to engage in conflict. Ideally, the in-
cumbent wants to induce economic activity by retaining αe. But, when the cost of
mobility is sufficiently high, the incumbent needs to offer more to the opposition to
prevent conflict.
The reader may wonder whether these equilibrium regimes all exist for different
parameters and choices of primitives. It is easy to show that as long as waging
conflict results in a strictly positive increase in the chances of winning power, all
three regimes can arise in equilibrium.
Corollary 1. Suppose there exists d ∈ (0, 1) such that pd(pi0) − pc(pi0) ≥ d for
all pi0. Then, there exists pi
∗ ∈ (0, 1) and k∗ ∈ (piA0 , 1) such that for piA0 > pi∗ and
k > k∗, we have 0 < φ1 < φ2 < φ3 = φ4 < 1.





. This implies that for all pi0 > pi














0 ) − pc(piA0 ). These together imply 0 < φ3 =
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φ4 < 1. Moreover, we have 0 < φ1 < φ3 = φ4. Now, as k changes from pi0 to 1,
φ2 monotonically increases from 0 to φ3. Setting k
∗ such that φ2 = φ1, we have the
ordering 0 < φ1 < φ2 < φ3 = φ4 < 1.
Below, we present a specific example.
Example 1. Suppose that the contest success functions are pd (pi) = pi (pi + d (1− pi)),
and pc (pi) = pi (pi + c (1− pi)). Both functions increase in pi and satisfy our con-
cavity condition for all d ≥ 0. Also, d ≥ c ⇒ pd (pi) ≥ pc (pi). If d = 1,
pd (pi) = pi–i.e., the success probability is measured by the group size. If d > 1,
the ruling group enjoys an incumbency advantage, in addition to the size effect,
along the economic path. Figure 1 plots the success probabilities and the equilib-
rium regimes for any φ and pi0 (for d = 2, c = 0.5 and k = 0.9). Notice that open
conflict does not necessarily occur at a high cost of mobility. Further, peaceful bel-
ligerence occurs for high values of pi0 and φ. The dotted line shows the optimal
group size p˜i . If the initial incumbent group size is below p˜i, switching happens in
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Figure 1: Incumbent’s success probabilities (left) and equilibrium regimes(right)
III Implications and Empirical Predictions
Below, we discuss some important implications and empirical predictions of our
framework.
III.A Mobility as a source of conflict
Conflict is an inefficient activity in our framework. The standard rational explana-
tion for observing inefficient conflict appeals to asymmetric information and limited
commitment with the use of power (see Fearon (1995), Garfinkel and Skaperdas
(2007), Powell (2004)). A key insight in this paper is that we identify a new source
of conflict: The possibility of mobility. It turns out that the possibility of inter-group
mobility can actually increase the likelihood of conflict in society.
To see why, we present two extensions of our model. In the first, we completely
shut down the possibility of moving across groups. In particular, we relax the as-
28
sumption φ ∈ [0, 1], and, instead assume that the cost of mobility is so large that
there is no incentive to switch group membership at any allocation. We show that
in this case, conflict does not arise in equilibrium. In this sense, the possibility of
mobility gives rise to conflict in our framework.
Second, we consider an extension in which agents can commit to not switch
group membership, even when mobility is possible (φ is low). Again, we find that
open conflict does not arise in equilibrium. Below we discuss these extensions in
detail.
III.A.1 No open conflict when inter-group mobility is limited
Suppose that the cost of mobility, φ, is large enough that there is no incentive to
change groups: In effect, there is no possibility of moving across groups. We show
that, open conflict does not arise, and the unique equilibrium is peaceful belliger-
ence.









. Then we must have peaceful
belligerence without switching in equilibrium. The equilibrium offer in the first
period is α∗ = 1 − (pd(piA0 ) − pc(piA0 )) and there is full extraction in the second
period.
The proof is straightforward, and is in the Appendix. The intuition is as follows.










tively means that there is no switching constraint on the incumbent, i.e. ae = 1.
Clearly, in the second (last) period, the ruling group will extract all surplus. This
means that, by engaging in conflict in the first period, the opposition can increase its
second period payoff by pd(pi
A
0 ) − pc(piA0 ). Thus, the maximal feasible first period
26This assumption on φ ensures that even if one group keeps all the surplus to itself, it is not in
the interest of the members of the other group to switch.
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offer on the economic path is α = 1 − (pd(piA0 ) − pc(piA0 )). Now consider the de-
cision of the first period incumbent. If conflict were not destructive, the incumbent
would be indifferent between the economic path and the conflict path: He would get
(pd(pi
A
0 ) − pc(piA0 )) less in period 1, and the same amount more in expected terms
in period 2. However, since conflict also destroys an amount (1− k) of surplus, the
incumbent is strictly worse off on the conflict path.
Therefore, when there is no mobility, there is no open conflict in equilibrium.
This contrasts sharply with work by Caselli and Coleman (2013) which predicts that
conflict is more likely to occur in societies divided along lines of race or ethnicity
where mobility is very costly. The main reason they obtain such a result is that they
do not consider the possibility that if enough resources are shared with the opposi-
tion, they might be prevented from engaging in conflict. In fact, our work suggests
that conflict only arises when excessive mobility threatens to dilute the incumbent’s
per capita share of the allocation required to prevent conflict. Therefore, we predict
that conflict (and consequent expropriation) arises only at lower or moderate levels
of cost of mobility.
As mentioned in the introduction, our prediction is consistent with casual em-
pirical observation. There are examples of societies divided along ethnicity or caste
(high cost of mobility) where there is no conflict, and, indeed, resource sharing
occurs. For instance, Padro´ i Miquel (2007) mentions Ivory Coast as an example,
where the opposition is strong enough that it needs to be bought off: Houphouet-
Boigny’s regime in Ivory Coast was known to actually transfer resources to the
minority opposition ethnic groups. Another example is India, where resources are
shared with backward castes through a range of reservation policies, which have
helped in mitigating conflict. Such sharing in the shadow of conflict arises in equi-
librium in our model. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that there is no sim-
ple monotonic relationship between mobility and conflict (see Collier and Hoeffler
30
(2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003)).27 There are examples in which intense con-
flict arises between groups where the cost of mobility is low (e.g., language-based
discrimination), as well as others where cost of mobility is very high, and yet con-
flict does not arise. Our model yield equilibrium predictions that are consistent with
these diverse examples.
III.A.2 No open conflict if agents commit to not switch groups
In our model, agents cannot commit to staying in their own group, but can choose
to switch groups after observing the allocation choice. This lack of commitment re-
lated to switching group membership indeed restricts the allocation choices that can
be implemented on the economic path. In particular, an allocation that can Pareto
improve upon the conflict outcome may require groups to retain their original sizes.
But, since agents cannot commit to not switch, the incumbent is left with fewer
allocation choices that are implementable. Note that the highest allocation that the
incumbent can retain in the first period, while avoiding conflict, is α. However,
if the cost of mobility is not very high, then α induces too much switching from
the opposition, thus reducing the incumbent’s per capita share so much that the ex-
pected payoff on the economic path is no longer worth avoiding conflict. Therefore,
there is an intermediate range where the incumbent prefers to induce conflict.
To better understand how the possibility of mobility is really a source of conflict,
it is useful to ask what would happen if agents could commit to not changing groups.
Consider a hypothetical game where, in the first period, the opposition can choose
to commit to not switching after observing the allocation. In this “new game,”
27Fearon and Laitin (2003) write “. . . it appears not to be true that a greater degree of ethnic or re-
ligious diversity-or indeed any particular cultural demography-by itself makes a country more prone
to civil war. This finding runs contrary to a common view among journalists, policy makers, and
academics, which holds ”plural” societies to be especially conflict-prone due to ethnic or religious
tensions and antagonisms.”
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first, nature chooses the incumbent; then, the opposition decides whether or not to
commit; and then, the original game is played.28 Consider the situation in this new
game where the opposition does not commit not to switch. Clearly, this subgame is





+1+φ(1−piA0 )(2pc(piA0 )−1) and PB = 1+φpiA0 (1−2pc(piA0 )).
Now, suppose that the opposition commits to not switch after any allocation α is








Notice that group A’s (B’s) payoff is strictly increasing (decreasing) in α. The
incumbent will, therefore, offer α∗, where α∗ is the maximum share that it can
retain without inducing conflict (ENSB (α
∗) = PB). A comparison of the above
payoffs yields the result that the allocation α∗ strictly Pareto-dominates the conflict
outcome. In particular, at allocation α∗, the opposition is at least as well off as
under conflict, and the incumbent is strictly better off. So, if the opposition has the
choice to commit to not switching, conflict does not arise in equilibrium. Further,
it is easy to check that, in the original game with no commitment, the allocation
α∗ would not be optimal, as it would induce “too much” switching and reduce the
per capita payoff of the incumbent. We state this formally in the proposition below.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 4. Assume that A is the incumbent group in period 1. Consider a new
game where, in period 1, group B has the option to commit not to switch before A
28Here, we allow a commitment decision only in period 1. A similar result holds if we allow
commitment in both periods.
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offers an allocation.
i) Open conflict cannot arise in equilibrium in this game.
ii) Whenever the open conflict equilibrium exists in the original game, the equi-
librium in the corresponding new game Pareto-dominates the open conflict
outcome.
III.B Inefficient switching
Like conflict, switching is also inefficient in our model. Individuals incur cost in
switching, but the aggregate surplus remains fixed. There are two factors that ex-
plain why we observe inefficient switching in equilibrium in our model: Uncer-
tainty about the future distribution of power and myopic agents. Because of the un-
certainty, the incumbent has a motive to induce opposition members to switch over,
in order to increase its chances of retaining power. However, even in the presence
of this uncertainty, switching may have been prevented if agents were non-myopic.
With non-myopic agents, any equilibrium allocation that causes switching would
have to leave the switchers and non-switchers in the opposition with the same ex-
pected two-period payoff.
The incumbent would get no benefit from inducing switching, since any in-
crease in second-period payoff from increased political strength would have to be
exactly offset by an increase in the first-period share to be given to the non-switchers
in the opposition. But, with myopic agents, the incumbent need not internalize the
cost of switching, and this together with the uncertainty about the distribution of
power drives switching in equilibrium.29
29A detailed analysis of the setting with non-myopic agents is available from the authors. In this
setting, even though there is no actual switching in equilibrium, the threat of switching still restricts
the set of implementable allocations. In particular, in the no-conflict regime, the switching constraint
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III.C Deterrents to conflict
In our setting, there are two factors that affect incentives to engage in conflict. First,
as conflict becomes more destructive, (i.e., as k decreases), the incumbent wants to
avoid conflict. Second, as the potential gains (success probability) from conflict
increase, (i.e., as pd(pi)− pc(pi) increases), the opposition is more prone to conflict.
For open conflict to arise, both groups must want it to occur. To understand better
what drive conflicts, it useful to look at comparative statics with respect to k and
pd(pi)− pc(pi) = 0.
We find the intuitive result that, the range of mobility costs for which open
conflict can arise increases with k. But equilibrium allocations are independent
of k. In other words, conflict is observed only when it is not very destructive.
In particular, if k = 0 and conflict were completely destructive, then open conflict
would never arise. This is, indeed, a feature of all models where agents have perfect
information about the cost of conflict and the success probability.30
The role of the success probability of conflict is more subtle, as it affects equi-
librium allocations as well. Consider the extreme case of pd(pi)− pc(pi) = 0. This
means that conflict does not give the opposition any gain in terms of increased
chance of winning. We should expect that this would eliminate conflict in equilib-
rium. However, it turns out that if the opposition is large enough, it may still wage
conflict in order to preserve its group size and prevent an erosion of political power.
binds. The binding switching constraint also implies that, if there were some heterogeneity in φ
among agents, inefficient switching would arise again, even with non-myopic agents. This would be
entirely driven by the uncertainty about the future distribution of power.
30To this extent, our model does not explain why we observe highly destructive conflict such as
civil wars. Highly destructive conflict could arise in equilibrium if there were some incomplete
information about cost or success parameters. See, for example, Wa¨rneryd (forthcoming), Collier
and Hoeffler (2007), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for discussion of the role of information in
conflict.
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III.D Peaceful belligerence does not arise with small incumbents
A prediction of our model is that if the incumbent group is a small minority of elites,
then only two situations can arise in equilibrium: Either, there is open conflict, or
there is no conflict, with the equilibrium allocation being driven by the switching
constraint.
Proposition 5. Assume that A is the incumbent group in period 1 with size piA0 .
There exists a threshold
¯
pi, such that, if piA0 ≤ ¯pi, then peaceful belligerence does not
occur in equilibrium. This threshold is increasing in k.
The proof of the result is in the Appendix. If the initial group size is low enough,
full expropriation leads to a large pie being shared among a small number of indi-
viduals, raising the per capita payoff. In such a situation, the incumbent will prefer
full expropriation to the maximal payoff obtainable on the economic path for any
value of φ.
Indeed, Propositions 2 and 5 together imply that peaceful belligerence occurs
only for high values of both pi and φ. In other words, in a society with a high cost
of mobility, if a majority group assumes power, then it will share spoils with the
minority to retain power and prevent conflict, but if the minority is in power, then it
will have an incentive to extract all surplus.
It is worthwhile to ask if this predicted relationship between size of incumbent
group, destructive nature of conflict (parameter k) and the prevalence of conflict
is borne out in data. There are many qualitative studies that provide evidence of
repressive minority regimes that engage in economic exclusion (See, for instance,
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) and Gellner (1983)). However, to the best of our
knowledge, there are no quantitative empirical studies that focus on this specific
question. The most closely related empirical literature on group sizes considers the
relationship between conflict and different characteristics of the group size distri-
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bution such as measures of polarization or fractionalization.31 These existing em-
pirical studies cannot be connected in an obvious way with our predictions. First,
existing empirical literature does not consider the practice of economic exclusion,
and does not measure the relative strength of the minority regime during conflict.
Further, the measures of fractionalization and polarization are inadequate to dis-
tinguish between small and large incumbent groups in a two-group setting such as
ours. There is a recent literature that asks whether these measures are appropri-
ate predictors of conflict in settings with minority incumbents, and the results are
not unambiguous. Cederman and Girardin (2007) point out the inadequacy of the
fractionalization measures to capture the effect of minority incumbents, and provide
evidence that the states with minority rules are vulnerable to civil war, while Fearon,
Kasara and Laitin (2007) find weak support for the conclusions of Cederman and
Girardin (2007).
III.E Non-monotonic equilibrium allocations
Our model implies that the equilibrium allocation is non-monotonic in the cost of
mobility. This result has testable implications, and a systematic empirical analysis
would be interesting.
Proposition 6. The equilibrium allocation is increasing in the cost of mobility in
the no-conflict regime, decreasing in the peaceful-belligerence regime, and constant
in the open-conflict regime.
The result follows directly from Lemmata 4 and 5. The intuition is straight-
forward: In the no-conflict regime, the ruling group retains just enough surplus to
induce optimal switching. So, as switching becomes more costly, the incumbent
31See Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Montalvo and Reynald-Querol
(2005) etc.
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can keep more for itself. In the peaceful-belligerence regime, the equilibrium allo-
cation is the maximum that the incumbent can keep without provoking conflict. An
increase in the cost of mobility raises the premium from winning political power
and, thus, enhances the opposition’s incentive for conflict. The opposition has to be
offered more to be prevented from engaging in conflict, and, hence the equilibrium
allocation is decreasing. Finally, in the open-conflict regime, the incumbent induces
conflict by full expropriation.
III.F Ruling group’s preferred cost of mobility
In this paper, we assume that the cost of mobility is exogenous. We can ask what
the incumbent’s preferred cost of mobility would be, if he could choose it. Think
of two groups that can be distinguished based on multiple characteristics. For ex-
ample, two ethnic groups may develop different professional skills or different reli-
gious practices. These different characteristics are associated with different costs of
mobility. The group in power can decide the characteristic on the basis of which re-
sources would be allocated. Which social cleavage would the incumbent choose?32
Since the premium from power increases with the cost of mobility φ, we may ex-
pect the incumbent to choose a maximal cost of mobility. However, it turns out that
if conflict is sufficiently likely to change the regime, then the incumbent may prefer
an intermediate cost of mobility.
Proposition 7. Assume that A is the incumbent group in period 1 with size piA0 .




is above a threshold, then it’s
expected two-period per capita payoff is maximized at φ = 1.
32The incumbent may also be able to take measures to change the cost of mobility between the
groups. We can ask what its preferred level of mobility would be.
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ii) Otherwise, there can be an interior cost of mobility at which A’s expected
two-period per capita payoff is maximized.
The proof of the result is in the Appendix. The intuition is as follows. The
cost of mobility has two contrasting effects on the incumbent’s payoff. On the one
hand, a high cost of mobility means that the incumbent can retain a larger share
of resources along the economic path. This effect pushes the incumbent towards
preferring higher costs of mobility. On the other hand, a high cost of mobilitymeans
that the opposition is more inclined to engage in conflict and will expropriate more
if the incumbent loses power. This force pushes the incumbent towards preferring
a low cost of mobility. Together, it turns out that, if the incumbent is more likely
to retain power in conflict, then it prefers a cleavage with maximal cost of mobility.
If, on the other hand, it is less likely to retain power in conflict, then its equilibrium
payoff can be maximized at an interior cost of mobility.33
Horowitz (1985) recounts how color slowly became the preferred form of differ-
entiation compared to religion, between English and African slaves in seventeenth
century North America, as conversion to Christianity become more common.34 The
English perceived no threat of losing power in conflict. This enabled them to sustain
an extreme form of discrimination for a long time.
33It is important to note that at this interior optimal cost of mobility, we may observe peaceful
belligerence (if φ4 < 1) or open conflict (if φ2 < 1 < φ3) in equilibrium.
34Horowitz (1985, p 43) states that “. . . the English were originally called ‘Christians,’ while the
African slaves were described as ‘heathens.’ The initial differentiation of groups relied heavily on
religion. After about 1680, however, a new dichotomy of ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ supplanted the former
Christian and heathen categories, for some slaves had become Christians. If reliance had continued
to be placed mainly on religion, baptism could have been employed to escape from bondage.” See
also Caselli and Coleman (2013).
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III.G Inter-group mobility along the path of conflict
One of the implicit assumptions in our setting is that agents do not have the option of
switching group membership along the path of conflict. We make this assumption
for two reasons. First, it provides greater tractability, as we can ignore an additional
parameter - the cost of mobility during conflict. Second, the assumption is consis-
tent with the stylized fact that groups are more cohesive during times of conflict.
Stein (1976) documents findings from across disciplines and finds positive support
for the hypothesis that external conflict increases inter-group cohesion, especially
in cases when conflict can affect the group as a whole, and when the groups share
a pre-existing identity (both being basic features of our setting). Lewis (1961) and
Murphy (1957) also find strong association between in-group solidarity and con-
flict in their studies on social conflict among people of Zaer society in Morocco and
among people of Mundurucu society respectively.35
In this section, we relax the assumption and examine if the possibility of mo-
bility on the conflict path changes our results. In particular, we are interested in
understanding how ease of mobility during conflict affects the incidence of conflict
itself.36 We consider an alternative setting in which, agents can choose to switch
groups both along the economic path and on the path of conflict by incurring an
individual cost of φd and φc respectively. Recall, that we restricted φd to lie in the
range (0, 1) so that the optimal allocation rule along the economic path lies in the
open interval (0,1). However, we allow φc to be unrestricted (but strictly positive)
to get a fuller picture of the effects.
The possibility of switching in conflict makes the opposition less inclined to
35See also recent theoretical work by Hugh-Jones and Zultan (2013) and della Porta (2006) that ar-
gue that levels of within-group cooperation can be high during periods of external conflict. There are
also psychological studies on individual behavior at wartime, which provide support for increased
social cohesion at the time of conflict. See Lang (1972) for a survey of the literature.
36We thank an anonymous referee for raising this question and pushing us in the direction.
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wage conflict, relative to the original model. For the incumbent, there are two
opposite effects. On the one hand, switching by opposition members along the
conflict path reduces the per capita payoff in the current period. On the other hand,
the probability of retaining power in conflict increases. Thus, we cannot say a priori
whether mobility on the conflict path makes the incidence of conflict more or less
likely.
The following proposition shows that an analog of our main result in the original
model still holds.37 In other words, we still get the same three regimes in equilib-
rium depending on whether φd lies above or below certain thresholds; but, these
thresholds now depend on φc.
Proposition 8. Assume that A is the incumbent group in period 1 with size piA0 .
Suppose that on the path of conflict, a share k ∈ (0, 1) of the surplus is retained.
As before, let φd ∈ (0, 1) denote the cost of mobility along the economic path. Let





3 (each a function of φc) such that the equilibrium regimes (and respective
allocations α∗1) that arise in period 1, can be characterized as follows.
i) If φd ≤ φc1, then the no-conflict regime prevails (with allocation α∗1 = αe).
ii) If φd ∈ (φc1, φc2), then the open-conflict regime prevails (with α∗1 = 1).
iii) If φd ∈ (max{φc1, φc2}, φc3), then the no-conflict regime prevails (with α∗1 =
αe).
iv) If φd > max{φc2, φc3}, then either the peaceful belligerence regime occurs or
the open-conflict regime occurs.
37We omit the proof of the results in this section, as it is very similar to that in the main model.
The proof is available on the authors’ websites.
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To understand how mobility on the conflict path affects the outcome, we study
the thresholds φci (i = 1, 2, 3) in the proposition above, and compare them to the
thresholds φi (i = 1, 2, 3) in the original model, i.e., when mobility is not allowed
on the conflict path. Since the thresholds φi and φ
c
i , i = 1, 2, 3 are functions of the
group size of the incumbent, henceforth, we explicitly write the argument for these
functions, φi(·) and φci(·), i = 1, 2, 3.
Denote the group size of the incumbent on the conflict path at the end of the first
period by piAc .When there is no mobility on the path of conflict, we must have pi
A
c =
piA0 . However, if switching is possible on the conflict path, pi
A
c is weakly larger than
piA0 . Those who switch on the conflict path enjoy a current period per capita surplus
k
piAc
, while those who do not, get zero economic payoff in that period. Therefore,




For large enough cost of mobility, there is no switching on the conflict path and
piAc = pi
A
0 . On the other hand, when cost of mobility is low enough, everyone in the
opposition group switches to the incumbent and piAc = 1. In the intermediate range,




1 if φc ≤ k
k
φc
if k < φc ≤ kpiA
0




The corollary below specifies the relationship between the thresholds φci(·) for the
model with mobility during conflict and the thresholds φi(·) in the original model.
Corollary 2. Assume that A is the incumbent group in period 1 with size piA0 . Sup-
pose that on the path of conflict, a share k ∈ (0, 1) of the surplus is retained. As
before, let φd ∈ (0, 1) and φc > 0 denote the costs of mobility along the economic





c (φc)) = φi(pi)|pi=piAc , for i = 1, 2, 3
where piAc (φc) is the post-conflict group size and φi(pi)|pi=piAc denotes the threshold φi
of the original model if the initial incumbent size were piAc . In particular, if φc ≤ k
and pd(1) = pc(1) = 1, then φ
c
1 = 1.
The result above simply says that, the conflict thresholds in this new setting are
the same as the thresholds we would have got in the original model, not for piA0 but
corresponding to a larger group size. The intuition is simple. In the absence of mo-
bility on the conflict path, the initial group size piA0 is the relevant group size during
conflict. But, when switching is possible on the path of conflict, piA0 is replaced by
piAc , the post-switching group size on the path of conflict, which is (weakly) larger
than piA0 .
We can use these thresholds to see how mobility on the conflict path affects the
incidence of conflict. First we observe that, even though the post-conflict group
size piAc (φc) is (weakly) decreasing in φc, the thresholds (in particular, the regions
of conflict) do not vary monotonically with piAc , the group size on the conflict path.
Therefore, we cannot say, for instance, that every decrease in φc leads to a shrinking
of the parameter zone for which conflict occurs.




), there is no switching, and
therefore, we get exactly the same results as in the original model. In particular,
all three regimes can arise in equilibrium. On the other hand, when φc is small
(φc < k), everyone in the opposition has an incentive to switch, and we have pi
A
c =
1. Clearly, in this case, the opposition is forced to accept any allocation on the
economic path, and open conflict does not arise in equilibrium. Finally, when φc
is in an intermediate range (k < φc ≤ kpiA
0
), the analysis is more subtle. In this
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range, agents have an incentive to switch along the conflict path, but conflict may
or may not arise in equilibrium (depending on how φd compares with endogenously
determined thresholds given in Proposition 2). When conflict arises in this case, the





, as a result of switching.
To summarize, in a broad sense, we can say that if mobility is sufficiently easy
on the conflict path, then conflict is less likely in equilibrium. For instance, the
open conflict region (φc1, φ
c
2) vanishes whenever φc ≤ 1.38 In this case, either open
conflict does not arise at all, or arises only under special parameter specifications
(covered under Case (iv) of Proposition 8). It is also worth highlighting the special
case, in which the costs of mobility on the conflict path and economic path are
identical. When φc = φd = φ < 1, the threshold φ2 is negative, which again
implies, that the first open conflict region (φ1, φ2) vanishes. Again, open conflict
can arise only under limited circumstances.
The figure below presents an example with the different equilibrium regimes as
functions of φd and φc. We have adapted Example 1, to include mobility on the
conflict path. Figure 1 showed that open conflict is associated with small incum-
bent groups in the original model. Since a reduction in the cost of mobility during
conflict has the same effect on thresholds as that of an increase in piA0 , we would
expect conflict to occur less frequently as mobility becomes easier on the path of
conflict.
In light of the discussion above, we can see that while increased mobility on
the economic path increases the likelihood of conflict, increased mobility on the
conflict path has the opposite effect. In this sense, the baseline model of the paper
applies in environments where mobility is substantially more difficult during times
38Note that φc ≤ 1 is equivalent to the post-conflict group size piAc being weakly larger than k.



























k = 0.9 , Π0 A = 0.65
Φc = k  Π0 A
Φc = k
Φc = k  Π0 A
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Figure 2: Equilibrium regimes when mobility is allowed on the conflict path
of conflict than peace. As mentioned above, this is consistent with many examples
in practice.
IV Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study group-based politics in divided societies, with the central ob-
jective of developing a coherent model that explains the relationship between inter-
group mobility in conflict. We present a model of political competition between two
groups, where political power implies the right to allocate society’s resources and
allows the possibility of engaging in economic exclusion based on group identities.
We model group membership to be endogenous: Individuals can switch groups by
incurring a cost, where this cost of mobility varies based on the nature of social
cleavage.
The main substance of the analysis is in showing (i) how the extent of inter-
group mobility determines the level of economic exclusion that a ruling group can
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exercise; and (ii) how these factors, in turn, determine the emergence of inter-group
conflict. We characterize how resources are shared in equilibrium and when conflict
arises.
Our analysis provides some new insight into why conflict may arise in equilib-
rium. We show that the possibility of endogenous group membership affects the
likelihood of conflict in society in a non-monotonic way: In particular, conflict can
arise for an intermediate range of cost of mobility. We also derive several predic-
tions that are consistent with stylized facts, and that have not been shown earlier.
For instance, we show that open conflict does not arise if inter-group mobility were
impossible. In particular, we can show that in equilibrium, a majority incumbent
may choose to transfer resources to the opposition to avoid conflict. We also show
that open conflict occurs at an intermediate cost of mobility.
However, many interesting questions remain unanswered. In this paper, since
we were interested in isolating the effect of inter-group mobility, agents were as-
sumed to be homogeneous except for their initial group membership. In many
contexts, it is more realistic to allow some within-group hierarchy: For instance,
new members and original members may be treated differently. Allowing a richer
action space that allows heterogeneous treatment may lead to new insights. An-
other assumption made for tractability is that the game lasts for two periods. While
we conjecture that many of the qualitative insights will carry over to an infinite-
horizon model, a fully dynamic model will allow us to analyze the dynamics of
regime changes and how group sizes evolve over time. Finally, a promising line
of investigation is related to the broader question of what constitutes the basis for
group formation in politics. For instance, when do groups form along ethnic lines
(with a high cost of mobility) and when do they form along ideological lines (a rel-
atively low cost)? Is there a theory that explains widespread politicization of ethnic
or religious identities? We leave these questions for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Results on Equilibrium Play in Period 2
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. It is straightforward to check that the functions f(·) and g(·) are strictly
increasing on [0, 1], and so, their inverses are well-defined. Consider an allocation
αW2 > f(pi
W











In other words, for a given incumbent group size piW1 , the per capita payoff of mem-
bers ofW2 exceeds that of members of L2 by more than φ. GroupW2 retains such
a large share of the resources that it will attract switchers from the opposition. The
size ofW2 would now increase to ensure that
αW2
piW2




⇔ αW2 = f(piW2 ).
The left-hand side is the second-period payoff of agents who switch from L2 toW2,
and the right-hand side is that for those who stay back in L2. Switching would occur
so that the group size adjusts to ensure that the two are the same. Analogously, if
the ruling group leaves too little for itself (αW2 < g(pi
W
1 )), there is an incentive for










and the size of groupW2 decreases to ensure indifference between those who switch
and those who do not. In this case, we have αW2 = g(pi
W
2 ). Finally, there is an
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intermediate range, αW2 ∈ [g(piW1 ), f(piW1 )], where members of neither group wants

















In this case, no switching occurs and piW2 = pi
W
1 .
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For αW2 < g(pi
W





= 1 − φ[1 −
piW2 (α
W




2 ) and, consequently, in α
W
2 . In the range













, which increases linearly in αW2 . For α
W
2 >





= 1 + φ[1 − piW2 (αW2 )] which is decreasing
in piW2 (α
W
2 ) and, therefore, in α
W








for groupW has a unique maximum, which occurs at αW2 = f(pi
W
1 ).
A.2 Proofs of Results on Equilibrium Play in Period 1



































+ 1 + φ(1− piA0 )(2pc(piA0 )− 1)
PB = 1 + φpi
A
0 (1− 2pc(piA0 )).
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A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 4
























α : α ≤ g (piA0 )}. By
Lemma 3, when αA1 < g(pi
A
0 ), this induces switching from A to B and the new size
of A is piA1 = g




























is increasing in αA1 .
Now, for αA1 ∈ [g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )], we know that no switching occurs and piA1 (αA1 ) =






1 )) is increasing in α in this range.
Finally, we show that EA first increases and then decreases in α
A







. Consider αA1 > f1(pi
A
0 ). We know, again from Lemma 3,
that this would induce switching from group B to group A and the new size of
group A would be piA1 = f









= 2 + 2φpd(pi
A
1 )(1− piA1 ),


















= piA. It follows




















+ 1 + φpiA1 (1 − 2pd(piA1 )). Since
pd(pi)(1− pi) is single-peaked, this implies that pi(pd(1− pi)) is single-peaked. Let
˜˜pi denote the value at which the maximum is attained. Consider the range where
αA1 < g(pi
A
0 ). In this case, switching leads to pi
A
1 = g
−1(αA1 ). Substituting for
αA1 = g(pi
A








= 1 + 1 + 2φpiA1 (1 − pd(piA1 )), which in-
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. Now consider αA1 ∈ [g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )]. In this range, no switch-
ing occurs (piA0 = pi
A
1 ). So, EB is decreasing in α
A





switching occurs along the economic path, and piA1 = f
−1(αA1 ). Substituting for
αA1 = f(pi
A








= 1 + 1− 2φpiA1 pd(piA1 )), which decreases
in piA1 and, therefore, also in α
A








is also single-peaked in









A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 5

























+ 1 + φpiA0 (1− 2pd(piA0 )) if αA1 ∈ [g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )]
2− 2φpiA1 pd(piA1 )) if αA1 > f(piA0 )
PB = 1 + φpi
A
0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
If αA1 = 0, switching would occur from A to B and pi
A
1 = g





0 )) = 1 + 1. At α
A
1 = 0, EB = 2 > PB . Moreover, Lemma
4 shows that the functionEB first increases and then decreases. This implies that ei-
ther PB intersects EB at exactly one point (which is given by α) or EB lies entirely
above PB, in which case α = 1.
First consider the case where α is given by the intersection between PB and EB.
We know that there cannot be two such intersections. Note, now, that at α = g(piA0 ),
EB > 2 > PB. Therefore, α > g(pi
A
0 ). If α ∈ (g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )), then α is given by
1− α
1− piA0
+ 1 + φpiA0 (1− 2pd(piA0 )) = 1 + φpiA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
α = 1− 2φpiA0 (1− piA0 )[pd(piA0 )− pc(piA0 )],
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which is decreasing in φ since piA0 ∈ (0, 1) and pd(piA0 ) ≥ pc(piA0 ). However, if
α > f(piA0 ), then α is given implicitly by the group composition pi that satisfies









− piA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
]
Since the LHS is strictly increasing in pi1 and the RHS is constant, there is a unique
solution to the equation. Also, since piA1 (α) is increasing in the range α > f(pi
A
0 ),
there is a uniqueα that corresponds to pi.Notice that pi and, hence, α is decreasing in




Therefore, EB = 1+ 1− 2φpd(1). By comparing PB with EB at αA1 = 1, it is easy
to see that EB ≥ PB for all αA1 with strict equality only at αA1 = 1 if and only if
φ ≤ 1
2pd(1) + piA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
:= φ1.
Since pd(·) is increasing and a probability, pd(1) > pc(piA0 ). This implies that φ1 >
0.
A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We know that group A’s payoff along the economic path is maximized





















= 2 + 2φpd(pi





























A.2.4 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. From Lemma 4, αe = f1(pi
A). Hence, we have
αe ∈ E ⇐⇒ EB(αe, piA1 (αe, piA0 )) ≥ PB
⇐⇒ φ ≤ 1












− 2pc(piA0 )) > piA0 (1 + 2pd(piA) −
2pc(pi
A
0 )) > pi
A
0 (1 + 2pd(pi
A) − 2pd(piA0 )) > 0, we must have φ3 > 0. Now, if
φ > φ3, clearly, α
e /∈ E. From Lemma 5, αe > α. Also, since EA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 )) is





strictly increasing in α in the range [0, α].




piA0 (1 + 2pd(pi
A
0 )− 2pc(piA0 ))
.








































Now, if φ ≥ φ4, we must have φ ≥ max{φ2, φ3}. Thus, the incumbent has
to choose between α and αP . Now, when α ∈ (g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )), then α is given by
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α = 1 − 2φpiA0 (1 − piA0 )[pd(piA0 ) − pc(piA0 )]. Substituting for f(piA0 ), for α, we have
piA0 + φpi
A
0 (1 − piA0 ) = 1 − 2φpiA0 (1 − piA0 )[pd(piA0 ) − pc(piA0 )], or φ = φ4. Since
α is continuous and strictly decreasing in φ, α < f(piA0 ) for φ ≥ φ4. Therefore,
piA1 (α, pi
A
0 ) = pi
A
0 for φ ≥ φ4. Now, EA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 ))− PA is equal to
αA1 − k
piA0




since αA1 = 1− 2φpiA0 (1− piA0 )[pd(piA0 )− pc(piA0 )].
A.2.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First, by Lemma 5, if φ is below φ1, the opposition will accept any allo-
cation, and, therefore, in this range, the incumbent is forced to choose αe. The
choice of the incumbent matters only when φ > φ1. Now, as Lemma 6 shows,
when φ ≤ φ2, the incumbent actually prefers conflict to any allocation imple-
mentable along the economic path. If we have φ ∈ [φ1, φ2), the incumbent then
induces conflict by offering αP = 1. When φ > max {φ1, φ2} , then the incum-
bent prefers economic activity if αe, is accepted. By Lemma 7, αe is accepted if
and only if φ < φ3. Therefore, the incumbent offers α
e and induces economic ac-
tivity if φ ∈ (max {φ1, φ2} , φ3]. For φ > φ3, the incumbent must make a larger
offer α¯ to induce the economic path. For φ > max {φ2, φ3} , the incumbent has
to choose between α¯ and αP . If piA = piA0 , then it is easy to check that φ4 = φ3,
and then, by Lemma 4, for φ > φ4, the incumbent offers α¯, which is just enough
to prevent the opposition from launching conflict. However, if piA < piA0 , then we
have another range (max {φ2, φ3} , φ4) where the choice between open conflict and
peaceful belligerence depends on the cost and benefit of conflict.
Suppose that φ ∈ (max {φ2, φ3} , φ4). Since φ > max {φ2, φ3} , the optimal




0 )) − PA. From
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Lemma 5, α is continuous and strictly decreasing in φ. From the proof of Lemma
8, we know that when φ = φ4, α = f(pi
A
0 ). Therefore, for φ < φ4, α > f(pi
A
0 ).
Moreover, when α > f(piA0 ), we know that there is switching, and the consequent
group size piA1 (α, pi
A
0 ) is strictly increasing in α, and, therefore, strictly decreasing




0 ))− PA as Z(φ), and examine its sign as a
function of φ. Just for notational convenience, we write piA1 (α, pi
A
0 ) simply as pi(φ)







+ φ(1− 2pc(pi0)) + 2φpd(pi(φ)).






0 ))− 2pc(piA0 )
)
.
Open conflict prevails otherwise. When k = 0, Z(φ) = φ(1−2pc(pi0))+2φpd(pi(φ)) >
0. We now show that Z(φ) < 0 when k = 1. Z(φ) at k = 1 is
−1
pi









Since pi − pi > 0, if 1 − 2pc(pi) < 0, then Z(φ) is negative. Now, suppose that
1 − 2pc(pi) > 0. We have φ < φ4, implying that φ < 1pi[1−2pc(pi)+2pd(pi)] 1pi[1−2pc(pi)] .








Therefore, Z(φ) at k = 1 is negative.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3










which implies that even if group A retains all the surplus, no member of group B
finds it profitable to switch. Similarly, φ > 1
1−piA
0
implies that if group B keeps all
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surplus to itself, no member of group A finds it profitable to switch. Since there is
no switching in period 1, the group sizes remain the same in period 2, therefore the
same no-switching result holds. Therefore, αe = 1. The ruling group in period 2































= PB. Therefore, an offer of α
e will be rejected.









⇒ α = 1− (pd − pc)






















A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consider the subgame where the opposition does not commit not to switch.
Clearly, this subgame is precisely the “original game.” Let C denote the range of
φ, for which open conflict arises in equilibrium in the original game. From Proposi-






0 ))− 2pc(piA0 )
)
and φ <




+1+φ(1−piA0 )(2pc(piA0 )−1) and PB = 1+φpiA0 (1−2pc(piA0 )).
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Now, consider the subgame where the opposition commits not to switch. The pay-








We show that in equilibrium, the incumbent offers α∗, where α∗ is defined as by
ENSB (α
∗) = PB .
First, note that α∗ exists as long as φ ∈ (φ1, φ2). From the definition of α∗, we
have
α∗ = 1− 2φpiA0 (1− piA0 )(pd(piA0 )− pc(piA0 )).
Since pd(pi
A
0 ) > pc(pi
A
0 ), α





















0 )− pc(piA0 )) > 0⇒ φ > φ4.
Since φ2 < φ4, we must have φ < φ. Therefore, α
∗ ∈ (0, 1). Any α > α∗ will be
rejected, and will result in payoffs {PA, PB}.We show that ENSA (α∗) > PA.
ENSA (α
∗)−PA = 1− k
piA0




Therefore, the incumbent prefers offering α∗ (and inducing the economic path) to
conflict. Moreover, α∗ is the maximal share implementable on the economic path.
Since φ ∈ C, if the opposition does not commit, it earns a payoff of PB. On
committing not to switch groups, it earns the same amount. We assumed that the
the economic path is chosen when the opposition is indifferent. So, the opposition
commits not to switch in equilibrium. Finally, note that α∗−f(piA0 ) = (1−piA0 )[1−
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φpiA0 {2(pd(piA0 )− pc(piA0 )) + 1}] > 0, since φ < φ4.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Suppose that piA0 ≤ ¯pi = 2 −
√
4− k. Since k ∈ (0, 1),
¯
pi ∈ (0, 2 − √3).





4− k > 2− k ⇔ 4− k > 4− 4k + k2 ⇔ 3 > k
which is always true. Since piA0 < k, we must have φ2 > 0. Moreover, we have





− 2pc(piA0 ) <
k − piA0
piA0 (1− piA0 )
− 1
or 2pd(pi
A)(1− piA)− 2pc(piA0 )(1− piA0 ) <
k
piA0
+ piA0 − 2




+ piA0 − 2 > 2, i.e. kpiA
0
+ piA0 > 4.




+1 < 0 since k > piA0 >
(piA0 )
2. The admissible solution to k
piA
0
+ piA0 = 4 is ¯
pi = 2 − √4− k. Therefore, if




+piA0 > 4, which implies that φ2 > 1. If φ2 > 1, peaceful
belligerence does not occur in equilibrium. Moreover, it is easy to see that
¯
pi =
2−√4− k is increasing in k.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
To prove this result, we need the following lemma, which describes how the incum-
bent’s expected two-period per capita payoff varies with the cost of mobility in the
different equilibrium regimes.
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Lemma 9. Suppose that A is the incumbent group in period 1 with size piA0 , and
let VA (φ) denote A’s expected two-period per capita payoff as a function of the
cost of mobility φ. In the no-conflict equilibrium regime, VA is increasing in φ. In
the open-conflict regime and in the peaceful-belligerence regime with no switching,





. In the peaceful-belligerence

























in the no-conflict regime
in the open-conflict regime
in the peaceful-belligerence regime
.








is strictly increasing in the cost of mobility φ






The relationship between the incumbent’s payoff in the peaceful-belligerence
regime and the cost of mobility depends on whether or not switching occurs in
equilibrium. First, consider peaceful belligerence without switching. Such a case
arises if α ∈ [g(piA0 ), f(piA0 )]. In this case, EA(α, piA1 (α, piA0 )) = 1piA
0













Next, consider the peaceful-belligerence regime with switching. Such a case




= PB. As derived in the
proof of Lemma 5, we see that α is given implicitly by the group composition pi (=
piA1 (α, pi
A






− piA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 ))
]
, and pi is decreasing




0 )) + (1− pi)EB(α, piA1 (α, piA0 )) = 2.














φpiA0 (1− 2pc(piA0 )).





, all the terms in (A.1) are positive





0 )) (in the peaceful-belligerence regime with switching) to be in-






Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. We can re-write VA(φ) as follows:
VA(φ) = max{E ′A(φ), P ′A(φ)}




e)) for φ ∈ [0, φ3]
EA(α, pi
A
1 (α)) for φ ∈ (φ3, 1]
and P ′A(φ) =

 0 for φ ∈ [0, φ1]PA for φ ∈ (φ1, 1]





, VA(φ) is max-
imized at φ = 1. As EA(α
e, piA1 (α
e)) = EA(α¯, pi
A
1 (α¯)) at φ = φ3, it follows that
E ′A(φ) is continuous in φ ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemma 9, if pc(piA0 ) > 12 , EA(αe, piA1 (αe)) is
strictly increasing in φ ∈ [0, φ3], EA(α¯, piA1 (α¯)) is strictly increasing in φ ∈ (φ3, 1]





, the function E ′A(φ) is
strictly increasing in φ ∈ [0, 1], and P ′A(φ), by construction, is constant over [0, φ1]
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and strictly increasing over (φ1, 1]. Notice that if there are real valued functions
f and g that are strictly (weakly) increasing over the same range, then the func-
tion max {f, g} will also be strictly (weakly) increasing over the same range. This
indicates that VA(φ) is weakly increasing over [0, φ1] and strictly increasing over
(φ1, 1]. Moreover, since VA(φ) = max{EA(αe, piA1 (αe)), 0} = EA(αe, piA1 (αe)) for
∈ [0, φ1], VA(φ) is strictly increasing over [0, φ1]. Therefore, VA(φ) is strictly in-
creasing (possibly discontinuously) over the entire range of φ.
To prove the second part of the proposition, we show that there may exist local





. By Lemma 9, VA (φ) is strictly decreasing over
(φ1, φ2]. As VA (φ) is increasing up to φ = φ1, we may have a local maximum at
φ1. A sufficient condition for this local maximum to be a global maximum is that
φ2 ≥ 1. Similarly, one can derive other sufficient conditions for φ = 1 not to be a
global maximum. For example, if φ4 < 1, by Proposition 2, we know that peaceful-






by Lemma 9, VA (φ) is decreasing in (φ4, 1]. Therefore, φ = 1 cannot even be a
local maximum in this case.
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